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The Club-K Anti-Ship Missile System: A Case Study in 
Perfidy and its Repression
by Robert Clarke*
IntroductIon
The Club-K anti-ship missile system represents a new and dangerous means of naval warfare, and one which exist-ing international humanitarian law (IHL) is ill-equipped 
to confront. Secreted inside the ubiquitous intermodal shipping 
container and placed on the deck of a cargo carrier, the missile 
system reveals itself only when the container roof opens, and the 
missile rises from concealment and launches.1 As footage of test 
launches and displays at defense exhibitions illustrate, the Club-
K’s ease of transport and concealment offers obvious advantages 
for a belligerent in an asymmetric conflict by allowing a read-
ily available launch platform to approach high-value warships 
unmolested and attack.2
While the only immediate victims of such an attack would be 
enemy combatants who are lawful targets under IHL, the weapon’s 
chameleon-like nature and 
advertised method of employ-
ment indicate that it is likely to 
be used to prepare and execute 
an attack while feigning civil-
ian status. Such tactics are an 
example of perfidy, deliber-
ately inducing trust on the part 
of an adversary in order to 
injure, kill, or capture them.3
A well-recognized breach 
of IHL, perfidy destroys the 
mutual trust on which all other rules depend for compliance, 
thereby sowing the seeds of further violations. In particular, 
this article submits that weapons like the Club-K would lead a 
belligerent, having recognized that apparently civilian vessels 
have been used to attack its forces, to suspect that other civilian 
vessels may be warships and attack them indiscriminately. Any 
military advantage gained from the use of such weapons would 
therefore come at the cost of increased risk to civilian life.
However, although it may undermine the distinction between 
warships and civilian vessels, the fact that the Club-K is likely to 
be used perfidiously would not necessarily inculpate the weapon’s 
manufacturers. In particular, the structural discreteness 
of the armed forces would make it difficult to prove a mental 
nexus between the commanders who determine the method of 
attack and the arms makers who provide the means. Thus, while 
the protection of civilians requires an institutional separation 
between them and combatants, such a divide may prevent the 
repression of civilian activity which imperils that same protection.
PerfIdy or ruse
QuestIon of confIdence
Although armies have employed deception since time imme-
morial, long-standing custom prohibits acts of treachery.4 This 
juxtaposition is restated in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I of 
the Geneva Convention, under which belligerents may employ 
ruses of war but not “kill, injure or capture an adversary by 
resort to perfidy,” that is, by exploiting the protection conferred 
by IHL.5 Both Article 37 and the customary rule it embodies 
apply to naval warfare, and as the San Remo Manual observes, 
civilians at sea are generally 
entitled to the same protection 
in times of armed conflict as 
those on land.6
Perfidy is composed of 
three elements — the invita-
tion of confidence, intention 
to betray that confidence, and 
fulfillment of that intention 
by killing, injuring, or captur-
ing the adversary.7 Although 
it is not perfidious to merely 
deploy the Club-K on a vessel, to use the weapon effectively its 
deceptive qualities must be parlayed into the preparation and 
execution of an attack under civilian guise. The example par 
excellence is to place the weapon on a converted merchant ves-
sel, as depicted by the manufacturers,8 and use the duo’s benign 
appearance to deceive and attack an enemy warship. The nature 
of the weapon therefore induces resort to tactics that exploit the 
obligation of warships to distinguish themselves and to limit 
attacks to military objectives, and thus constitute killing or injur-
ing by resort to perfidy.
PotentIal for decePtIon
The essence of perfidy is the invitation of confidence— 
the sowing of a belief in one’s adversary that they are legally 
obliged to accord protection to the attacking party,9 of which 
the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status is axiomatic.10 
It is a cardinal rule of IHL, implicit in the proposition that 
armed conflict is a state governed by law, that belligerents must 
distinguish military objectives from civilians and attack only 
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the former.11 Therefore, armed force may be used only against 
vessels for which nature, location, purpose, or use makes an 
effective contribution to military action and for which total or 
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite 
military advantage.12
The corollary of this rule is that those bearing arms must 
distinguish themselves. Military forces on the battlefield con-
stitute an exceptional subdivision of human society, in that as 
between themselves they may do acts ordinarily considered 
criminal, provided they are identifiable by insignia, open car-
riage of arms, and other means.13 Both rules represent the same 
fundamental tenet—that warfare is a relation between states alone 
and so to wage “total war,” that is, war without discrimination 
between a state’s military organs and the civilian population, is 
prohibited.14 All of the subsidiary protections extended to civil-
ians flow from this legal and practical distinction between them 
and combatants.
Therefore, to be armed and participate in hostilities, warships 
must be operated by state naval forces, distinguished by external 
markings, and listed on a public register.15 Warships may, in 
turn, be attacked at any time. Merchant vessels are ordinarily 
subject only to search and seizure but may not carry offensive 
weaponry or use armed force except in self-defense.16 A mer-
chant vessel’s legal protection therefore depends on its practical 
exclusion from hostilities, and to arm it with anti-ship missiles 
and thereby integrate it into a belligerent’s war effort exposes it 
to attack.17 However, if weapons like the Club-K and other dis-
tinctively military features could be concealed, the vessel could 
maintain both a powerful armament and the pretense that it is 
legally protected, thus inviting the confidence of an adversary.
betrayal and Intent
However, perfidy requires more than mere deception, and 
it is not perfidious to merely place a containerized missile 
launcher or other concealed armament on a vessel. The language 
of Additional Protocol I, which refers to killing or injuring “by 
resort to perfidy,” imports a causal link between the betrayal of 
confidence and the killing or wounding of enemy personnel.18 
To constitute a single transaction and thus an instance of perfidy, 
the invitation of confidence must be the “proximate cause” of 
the subsequent attack.19 Perfidy also has a subjective aspect, the 
intention to abuse the protection conferred by IHL.20
For these causal and subjective elements to be present, the 
Club-K must be an effective cloak for the launch vessel’s true 
nature. As discussed above, it could conceal one obvious fea-
ture, but to invite and betray the confidence of an adversary the 
launch vessel would need to eschew all outward signs of military 
character, whether visual, acoustic, or electronic. In this respect, 
the Club-K differs from weapons which are of themselves inher-
ently perfidious and unlawful, such as landmines disguised as 
innocuous items. To be effective, the Club-K must be married to 
other deceptive measures.21
Warships require an extensive suite of weapons to engage 
and defend against air and seaborne targets, as well as a corre-
spondingly large crew.22 Since the signature hull, superstructure, 
marks, lighting, and electronic emissions of a dedicated warship 
would deprive the Club-K of deceptive value, the only suitable 
launch vessel is that depicted by the weapon’s manufacturers—a 
converted merchant vessel. Although the manufacturers insist 
that it cannot be placed on “any container carrier,” they do 
expressly indicate that it is “designed for installation on the ships 
called up for military service” rather than dedicated warships 
such as “corvettes, frigates, destroyers [and] cruisers.”23 That is, 
it is intended to be deployed on merchant vessels requisitioned 
for naval service. Such conversion of civilian ships to military 
use, including participation in hostilities, is lawful provided that 
they are marked and registered as set out above.
Due to their design, however, merchant vessels are easily 
adaptable only to logistical, rather than combat functions.24 And 
even if technically feasible, giving a merchant vessel all the 
combat capabilities of a true warship would, for the reasons set 
out above, imbue it with a conspicuously military appearance. To 
realize the deceptive potential of the Club-K, the attacker must 
rather eschew the ability to defend themselves and stake success 
on the launch vessel’s civilian appearance. Notwithstanding the 
long range of Club-type missiles,25 it is unlikely that the launch 
vessel could otherwise safely approach a superior enemy force. 
In the ordinary course of events, therefore, the abuse of con-
fidence would be both a causal precondition of the attack and 
intended as the ideal or indeed only possible avenue for success.
ruses of war
If using the Club-K to kill or injure under cover of civilian 
status is perfidious, there remains the question of when feigning 
such status passes from ruse of war to perfidy. Ruses—decep-
tive measures which neither infringe a rule of law nor invite the 
confidence of an adversary with respect to its protection—are 
expressly permitted by Additional Protocol I.26 Submarines and 
landmines, for example, use deception more or less continually, 
but the analogy which the Club-K’s manufacturers draw with 
them is incorrect—submarines and landmines conceal them-
selves using the natural environment, not by feigning civilian 
status. Moreover, as stated above, use of landmines disguised as 
innocuous items is prohibited.27
However, the established usages of naval warfare do allow 
warships to fly false flags and feign the appearance of merchant 
vessels provided that they show their “true colors” before going 
“into action,” “actual armed engagement,” or “launching an 
attack.”28 This is in contrast to hospital ships and other vessels 
having special protection, the imitation of which is prohibited 
at all times.29 If IHL grants warships this license to invite the 
confidence of an adversary when not participating in hostilities, 
can the Club-K be used consistently therewith?
Total War
Since armed forces seldom publicize the deceptive measures 
they employ, such acts remain clandestine and thus incapable of 
inducing reliance by others.30 One must therefore look to his-
tory for concrete state practice. For a weapon like the Club-K to 
appear only at the moment it is fired is consistent with the way 
that converted merchant vessels and enemy uniforms were used 
for deception during World War II, but the context in which such 
tactics were employed raises its own legal problems.
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At sea, both sides employed converted merchant vessels 
which literally dropped the façade concealing their armament 
moments before opening fire.31 British “Q-ships,” for example, 
masqueraded as merchantmen to provoke German submarines 
to recklessly attack an apparently vulnerable target. However, 
the circumstances of 
total war then pre-
vailing call into 
question the con-
tinued relevance of 
such practice.
These tactics were 
considered during the 
Nuremberg trial, in 
which admirals Karl 
Doenitz and Erich 
Raeder were charged 
with waging unrestricted submarine warfare. The International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) held that the total integration of Britain’s 
merchant navy into the war effort exposed its vessels to attack 
because they constituted what would now be termed military 
objectives.32 Since Germany conducted hostilities on precisely 
that basis, Q-ships could not and did not purport to be protected 
against attack—their appearance was designed to invite rather 
than discourage attack. Moreover, since they were justified as 
a reprisal for unrestricted submarine warfare, they provide no 
evidence of opinio juris and hence of customary law.33
Battlefield deception was also dealt with in the Skorzeny 
Case, so named for the German colonel whose commando wore 
Allied uniforms up until the moment of opening fire.34 In this 
respect, it should be noted that the case did not concern imitation 
of civilians, which directly impinges on the principle of distinc-
tion. Nevertheless, the fact that Skorzeny was acquitted because 
his stratagem was regarded as lawful by several states does sug-
gest that some deceptive measures could be lawfully employed 
as ruses as long as they were discontinued immediately before 
firing on an adversary.
Limited War
A significant number of states have since prohibited the use 
of enemy uniforms to “favor” or “impede” military operations, 
signifying a hardening of attitudes toward such deception even 
outside of combat stricto sensu.35 And, of more direct relevance 
to the imitation of civilians, Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol 
I requires regular forces on land to distinguish themselves 
from civilians during military operations preparatory to an 
attack—a reflection of the importance now accorded to the 
principle of distinction.36
With respect to naval warfare, the San Remo Manual states 
that the Q-ship may no longer lawfully operate in the context 
of limited warfare. Such vessels are said to exemplify the “cru-
cial element” of perfidy—the simulation of protected status 
while “an act of hostility is prepared and executed.”37 This 
notion—that perfidy includes deception during preparation of 
an attack—accords with Additional Protocol I, which refers to 
an act of deception done with intent to kill, wound or capture.38
Therefore, a vessel using the Club-K could not conceal its 
true nature up until the moment of launch. Modern law requires 
that the disguise be discarded once the intent to attack is formed 
and, at any rate, before preparation of the attack. Like many 
other rules embodied in Additional Protocol I, this is essentially 
a reflection of the 
greater protection 
now accorded to 
civilians and the 
world’s rejection of 
total war. However, 
by effectively requir-
ing a belligerent to 
act perf idiously, 
the Club-K would 
encourage exactly 
this method of 
warfare.
the cordon sanItaIre and free navIgatIon  
of the hIgh seas
Perfidious methods of warfare not only expose combatants to 
being treacherously killed or wounded—they also undermine the 
longstanding compromise between belligerent rights of warships 
and neutral rights of free navigation. Naval warfare occurs largely 
in the international realm of the high seas, where the practice of 
re-flagging allows a belligerent to conceal both its warships and 
maritime supply lines.39 Warships may therefore direct belligerent 
measures against vessels of actual or ostensible neutrality.40 For 
reasons of self-defense, warships may also establish a cordon san-
itaire, or exclusion zone, allowing them to pre-emptively attack 
approaching vessels.41 The dangers inherent in such prerogatives 
are controlled by a regime safeguarding free navigation.42
Insofar as it corresponds to the point at which approaching 
vessels constitute threats whose destruction is militarily advanta-
geous, the cordon is the geographical expression of the principle 
of distinction as the boundary of warfare. An excessive cordon, 
however, simply leads to indiscriminate attacks. The San Remo 
Manual affirms that the declaration of such zones does not abro-
gate the duty to distinguish between military objectives and other 
vessels.43 However, that conclusion was not unanimous among its 
framers, and a belligerent anticipating that any merchant vessel 
may carry anti-ship missiles is likely to employ particularly drastic 
measures in self-defense—to the detriment of enemy and neutral 
shipping alike.
During the First Gulf War, excessive exclusion zones were 
repeatedly condemned for facilitating indiscriminate attacks on 
neutral vessels.44 In a tragic epilogue, the intervention of neutral 
states would later affirm how easily tragedy can result from 
misidentification in a high-traffic maritime environment, with 
a number of civilian vessels being destroyed after approach-
ing warships.45 As the experience of the World Wars and more 
recent conflicts show, methods of war which erase the distinction 
between military and civilian vessels lead others—consciously 
or not—to reciprocate and are therefore to be denounced.46
Perfidious methods of warfare not only expose 
combatants to being treacherously killed or 
wounded—they also undermine the longstanding 
compromise between belligerent rights of warships 
and neutral rights of free navigation.
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weaPons of deceIt and InternatIonal law
Although belligerents may employ ruses, to use a concealed 
weapon such as the Club-K to prepare and execute an attack while 
feigning civilian status crosses the border from lawful deception 
to perfidy—the intentional abuse of legal protection to kill, injure, 
or capture an adversary. Only warships enjoy belligerent rights 
and are therefore always subject to attack. Merchant vessels are 
prohibited from participating in hostilities and are ordinarily sub-
ject only to search and seizure. Therefore, for a warship to imitate 
such vessels invites others to accord it concomitant protection.
Although such measures are permitted when not preparing 
or executing an attack, a vessel armed with the Club-K would 
most likely ensure its success by acting in a designedly treacher-
ous fashion, feigning civilian status throughout an engagement. 
The objects and purposes of IHL dictate that such tactics be 
recognized as perfidious, for they would provoke belligerents to 
collapse the distinction between military and civilian vessels on 
which the very rule of law in naval warfare depends.47
This endangers not only vessels and abstract economic inter-
ests but also the life and security of civilians on the high seas. The 
victims of naval warfare during the World Wars are a sufficient 
testament to that fact—one of many that lead states to adopt rules 
ending the practice of total war. However, as more recent conflicts 
illustrate, those rules are only as strong as the good faith and trust 
which a belligerent reposes in adhering to them—trust which per-
fidy, more than any other violation of IHL, destroys.
rePressIon of PerfIdIous methods of warfare
ProsecutIon and arms control
If the Club-K is likely to be used perfidiously, this raises the 
question of how such acts can be repressed. Alongside explicit 
provision in the Rome Statute, perfidy has long been recognized 
as a war crime under customary law, opening up criminal prosecu-
tion as one remedy.48 However, despite a marked resurgence in the 
post-Cold War era, war crimes trials are not free of legal problems.
The example of the Club-K exemplifies one such issue, namely 
establishing the responsibility of accomplices. Accomplices fre-
quently play a vital role in facilitating a war crime, in particular 
by providing the means for its commission. Targeting both the 
principal offender and accomplices therefore multiplies the value 
of international law as a deterrent and crime prevention tool.49 
However, the mens rea required for criminal guilt under inter-
national law on complicity raises difficult questions of proof. 
Although arms control law presents an alternative, comprehensive 
prohibitions may be politically unachievable. Each avenue theo-
retically allows international law to be enforced on the battlefield 
by pursuing sanctions and criminal liability “behind the lines,” but 
both illustrate the difficulty of doing so.
comPlIcIty and deterrence
Command and Supply
When considering prosecution for crimes committed in 
combat, attention often falls first on the commander who orders 
a military operation due to the control which he exercises over 
combatants who physically commit the crime. Just as the horrors 
of war are contained by the obligation of combatants to distin-
guish themselves, they are also controlled by the demand that 
combatants operate under responsible command. Indeed, it is the 
fact of a command hierarchy culminating in a supreme political 
authority that defines warfare as a relation between states.50
However, the State is not solely responsible for crimes com-
mitted by members of its armed forces—it is well-accepted that 
military commanders and civilian superiors are responsible for 
offences committed on their orders.51 Nonetheless, given the 
law’s record of inconsistent enforcement—including against 
popular military figures—one might reasonably risk prosecution 
for the prospect of military gain. Perfidy was, for example, com-
mitted systematically by Iraqi forces in the Third Gulf War.52
Unlike such individual combatants, a weapon as large and 
complex as an anti-ship missile cannot easily be made to look 
innocuous. However, having been consciously designed to mimic 
civilian objects, the Club-K provides a ready means to attack 
while feigning civilian status. Moreover, as discussed in Part I, 
successfully deploying the weapon from a merchant vessel, as 
envisaged by the manufacturers, appears to depend largely on 
resort to perfidy. In that respect, design decisions at the logisti-
cal stage can influence military decisions in combat. The best 
vehicle for deterrence may, therefore, be the businessperson who 
provides the weapon.53 Arguably, if they play a major role in a 
chain of events likely to lead to a violation of IHL, they ought to 
be criminally responsible,54 but would they be?
Manufacturer’s Liability
International criminal law recognizes many doctrines of 
complicity, but this article focuses on aiding and abetting—the 
traditional basis for prosecuting providers of means. So as to 
avoid compounding a hypothetical situation with hypothetical 
or untested law, this article does not consider the prosecution 
of juridical persons or complicity under the nascent law of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) but 
focuses on customary law on aiding and abetting by business-
persons acting through a corporate instrumentality.
The archetypal case in this context is Zyklon B, in which the 
manufacturers of the eponymous toxin were held responsible 
for its use in concentration camp gas chambers because they 
had actual knowledge of that use. This mens rea requirement— 
cognizance that the customer intends to use one’s product to 
commit a crime—is broadly reflected in other Allied trials of 
German industrialists.55
However, as these trials illustrate, commercial actors present 
particular difficulties because they typically undertake “neutral” 
actions, providing material assistance, such as money or con-
sumables, which is amenable to legitimate uses. In acquiring 
such an item, the customer might not thereby put the seller on 
notice of their intent to commit a war crime.
For example, at Nuremberg, the IMT held that to be impli-
cated in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war, an accused had 
to know of a “concrete plan . . . clearly outlined in its criminal 
purpose.”56 Circumstances such as rearmament merely disclosed 
Hitler’s militaristic ideology,57 and businessmen who equipped 
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his armies were acquitted of aggression in the IG Farben Case.58 
By contrast, the Zyklon B accused knew of both the lethal 
properties of their insecticide and its ongoing use in the Nazi 
Holocaust, thus proving intent and knowledge sufficient to make 
them “concerned in” the commission of war crimes.59
The Club-K poses the same issue as the IG Farben Case, in 
that the formation of a concrete plan to use the weapon perfidi-
ously would depend on tactical decisions made by the belliger-
ent after it is supplied. And although the Club-K is marketed as 
a weapon of disguise, unlike warships, 
military vehicles and installations on land 
are not obliged to distinguish themselves, 
and therefore the weapon could lawfully 
be deployed from an apparently civil-
ian truck or train as a deceptive trap.60 
At most, the manufacturers are likely 
to be aware that their product might 
be used perfidiously at some undefined 
point in the future.61 In this respect, 
the Club-K stands in contrast to weap-
ons that cannot but be used unlawfully, 
the aforementioned booby trap being the 
quintessential example.
This is not to say that the manufactur-
ers will invariably be shielded by the fungibility of their wares. 
For example, German steel magnate Friedrich Flick was found to 
be complicit in the crimes of the Nazi SS, due to the considerable 
sums that he donated to its head, Heinrich Himmler. The fact that 
Flick was not aware of the specific activity to which the money 
was applied was held to be no defense because the notoriety of 
the SS was such as to charge him with knowledge that it would 
be criminal.62
Flick suggests that the manufacturers could be held responsible 
if the use to which the Club-K is put is simply the continuation 
of an established record of perfidy, common knowledge of 
which bridges the mens rea gap. On the other hand, it would not 
readily apply to a peacetime transaction where the possibility 
of perfidy is merely latent and the manufacturers, due to their 
structural separation from their customer’s armed forces, are 
not privy to its plans. It is precisely due to chaotic and brutal 
nature of war that the principle of distinction must be respected. 
However, ironically, the entrenched separation of the military 
and civilian spheres can make it impossible to connect the acts 
of military commanders in the wartime context with the acts of 
civilian businesspeople who are deliberately excluded from it.
arms control law — a de lege ferenda?
If a weapon’s manufacturers cannot be made responsible 
for its subsequent perfidious use, the remedy may be to 
make their conduct the primary locus for legal sanctions, by 
prohibiting the development, manufacture, and distribution of 
the Club-K and similar arms outright, as has been done with 
chemical and biological weapons.63 This course, however, poses 
a number of problems.
In particular, there is the definition of the banned item. Treaties 
typically refer to weapons “designed” to have certain technical 
characteristics or effects, such as poisoning.64 Although a treaty 
might prohibit weapons designed to facilitate perfidy, this involves 
an inquiry into the state of mind of the manufacturers vis-à-vis the 
weapon’s future use, bearing in mind that it has a range of possible 
applications. Such a definition would merely reframe, rather than 
overcome, the issues arising in criminal proceedings.
An alternative is to refer to weapons which outwardly resemble 
civilian objects, thus placing the emphasis on an objective charac-
teristic rather than subjective questions and hypothetical situations. 
However, such a ban raises vexing policy questions. As discussed 
in Part I, the gravamen of perfidy and what distinguishes it from 
ruses is the deliberate exploitation of IHL 
to attack an adversary. Thus, whether it is 
lawful for a warship to feign civilian sta-
tus depends on whether it is preparing an 
attack at the time.
A prohibition omitting any nexus to 
the distinction, which IHL draws between 
perfidy and ruse, would therefore tend 
to impede the use of legitimate forms of 
deception. Although this does not fore-
close on any possibility of treaty action, 
the prerogative to use deception during 
armed conflict has generally been jeal-
ously guarded.65 And, as illustrated by the 
United States’ refusal to ban landmines 
without a geographical exception for the Korean De-Militarized 
Zone, states are often reticent to completely forego weap-
ons with some residual military utility, even if it is narrowly 
circumscribed.66
conclusIon
The Club-K therefore poses a problematic issue for the law 
of naval warfare, both in terms of the limits of its lawful use and 
the repression of unlawful use. Since merchant vessels are not 
ordinarily exposed to attack, to deliberately exploit their appear-
ance to penetrate a warship’s defenses and attack it amounts 
to perfidy. Such conduct endangers the civilian shipping of all 
nations and is not only unlawful but deservedly criminal. As past 
conflicts illustrate, indiscriminate naval warfare occasions more 
than damaged vessels and abstract economic loss—it injures and 
kills individuals whose only protection in the international realm 
of the high seas is states’ respect for the rule of law.
While this opens the door to prosecution of military com-
manders, the rules of complicity applied by international tri-
bunals are unlikely to net the businesspeople who supply such 
arms due to the difficulty of proving that they knew of a plan 
to use the weapon perfidiously. Although arms control law may 
obviate the need to prove any objective and subjective nexus 
between supplying the weapon and using it treacherously, states 
are unlikely to eschew its very possession.
The example of criminal prosecution, in particular, illustrates 
that the separation of the military and civilian spheres that IHL 
aims to preserve can impede its own enforcement. Although the 
principle of distinction between combatants and civilians must 
be upheld, it may be difficult to do so by policing the civilians 
who operate on the periphery of armed conflict. In safeguarding 
humanity in time of armed conflict, then, there can be no substi-
tute for inculcating among the armed forces a culture of respect 
for the rule of law and education in its precepts.
In safeguarding humanity in 
time of armed conflict, then, 
there can be no substitute for 
inculcating among the armed 
forces a culture of respect for 
the rule of law, and education 
in its precepts.
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